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NOTE
Giving up the Ghost in the Machine:
Emergency Cellphone Tracking Under 18
U.S.C. § 2702(c)(4) Is a Search
Andrew Guinan*

I. INTRODUCTION
In the post-September 11th world, our judiciary has been forced to
confront the truth that “all free peoples have had to balance the demands
of liberty with the demands of security.”1 This tension is not new, and in
the past, “we Americans have been able to plant our flag well down the
spectrum towards liberty.”2 Recently, however, the interception of
electronic communications and other data by local, state, and federal lawenforcement authorities has emerged as a central point in the debate.3
While many Americans might be willing to endure some degree of
intrusion under the threat of national terrorism, the situations that implicate
our most deeply held constitutional protections are rarely so clear or
dramatic. Should we allow police to gather location data from a suspected
robber’s cellphone as evidence without a search warrant?4 What about to
*A.B., Dartmouth College, 2010; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of

Law, 2022; Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2020-2021. I am extremely
grateful to Associate Dean Paul Litton for his insight, guidance, support, and patience
during the writing of this Note. I would also like to thank the members of the Missouri
Law Review, in particular, Note and Comment Editor Jack Gilkey, for their help in the
editing process.
1
Michael V. Hayden, Lt. Gen., U.S.A.F., Principal Deputy Dir. of Nat’l Intel.,
Address to the National Press Club: What American Intelligence & Especially the
NSA Have Been Doing to Defend the Nation (Jan. 23, 2006), https://www.cspan.org/video/?190835-1/intelligence-strategy-terrorism [https://perma.cc/3TXL6RUP],
transcript
at
https://fas.org/irp/news/2006/01/hayden012306.html
[https://perma.cc/5KDV-P28Q] (former director of the National Security Agency
(“NSA”) discussing NSA activities since September 11, 2001, including the
interception of communications, and balancing privacy and security).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018) (plurality
opinion).
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arrest him before he strikes again?5 What if not a robber but a drug
dealer?6 These examples may seem innocuous, even obvious to some. But
what happens when police suspect you, and what harm will you suffer
when it turns out they were wrong? These questions make up some of the
murkiest depths of American Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and
confusion persists over when and within what constraints law enforcement
can track your cellphone’s location in real time.7
Both statutory and constitutional law governs law-enforcement
acquisition of information regarding cellphone service subscribers,
including cellphone location data. The Stored Communications Act
(“SCA,” “the Act”), specifically 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3), restricts the
disclosure of cellphone data to the government by cellular service
providers,8 while § 2702(c)(4) (“the emergency provision”) provides an
exception for certain emergency situations.9 Other sections provide civil
remedies for “nonconstitutional violations” of the Act.10
The Fourth Amendment, meanwhile, prohibits unreasonable
searches by the government and requires that warrants issue based on a
finding of probable cause.11 Historically, however, these protections have
not attached when a person’s information is held by certain third parties,
including communications providers.12 Accordingly, some courts have
found that the short-term, real-time GPS tracking of a cellphone located
in a public place does not implicate constitutionally protected privacy
concerns and is therefore not a search under the Fourth Amendment. 13
Regardless, the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement, which aligns closely with the
emergency provision allowing disclosure of subscriber information under
§ 2702(c)(4), might justify such tracking without a warrant even if it were
a search.14 Finally, because the SCA provides exclusively civil remedies
when no constitutional violation has occurred,15 if a court finds that the
Fourth Amendment does not apply, criminal defendants cannot move to

5

See, e.g., United States v. Takai, 943 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1317–18 (D. Utah

2013).
6

See, e.g., United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 776 (6th Cir. 2012).
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
8
18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3).
9
18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(a)(3), (c)(4).
10
18 U.S.C. §§ 2707(a), 2708.
11
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
12
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979).
13
See, e.g., United States v. Riley, 858 F.3d 1012, 1017–18 (6th Cir. 2017) (per
curiam).
14
See, e.g., United States v. Gilliam, 842 F.3d 801, 804 (2d Cir. 2016).
15
18 U.S.C. §§ 2707(a), 2708.
7
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suppress cellphone location information disclosed in violation of §
2702(c)(4).16
Cellphones continuously and predictably transit areas traditionally
endowed with the strongest Fourth Amendment protections, like the
home.17 This supports an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in
location information gained from even short-term live tracking of a
cellphone. Without a clear standard holding that such tracking is a search,
police will be unable to determine if their actions will unreasonably violate
this expectation during any particular instance of tracking.18 Further,
while many such instances of short-term GPS monitoring will fall within
the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement,19 failing
to attach constitutional protections to short-term live tracking denies
defendants the opportunity to suppress evidence when police improperly
obtain GPS data under § 2702(c)(4), either by mistake or as the result of
misconduct.20 Holding such tracking to be a search also accords societal
expectations of privacy that change as technology advances; however, it
still permits police to avoid seeking a search warrant by invoking a
traditional warrant exception or by relying instead on an arrest warrant,
which may suffice for the purposes of short-term GPS tracking.21
Part II of this Note provides an overview of Fourth Amendment
protections, the SCA and its remedies, and the definition of a search in the
context of the so-called third-party doctrine. It also explores contemporary
cases which hold government collection of electronic location information
to constitute a search. Part III considers recent developments, in which
courts have nevertheless not required a warrant for police to engage in
real-time tracking of a criminal defendant’s cellphone. Part IV argues
courts should consider such short-term live tracking to be a search when
undertaken pursuant to the emergency provision of § 2702(c)(4) and
therefore require a search warrant absent narrow exceptions, including
exigent circumstances and the issuance of a valid arrest warrant. When
police engage in this type of tracking, Fourth Amendment safeguards are
required to shield a defendant’s constitutionally protected activities from
unforeseeable revelation, provide an adequate remedy when no exigency
is found, and serve the underlying purposes of the SCA. Short-term
requests for live cellphone GPS information pursuant to § 2702(c)(4)

16

People v. Moorer, 959 N.Y.S.2d 868, 875–76, 879 (Co. Ct. 2013).
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217–18 (2018) (plurality
opinion).
18
See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 39 (2001).
19
See, e.g., United States v. McHenry, 849 F.3d 699, 706 (8th Cir. 2017).
20
18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(4).
21
See United States v. Riley, 858 F.3d 1012, 1020 (6th Cir. 2017) (Boggs, J.,
concurring) (per curiam) (arrest warrant); United States v. Takai, 943 F. Supp. 2d
1315, 1322–23 (D. Utah 2013) (exigency).
17
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should therefore be considered a search under the Fourth Amendment and
presumptively require a search warrant.

II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, THE SCA, AND THE RISE AND FALL
OF THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE
Section 2702(a)(3) of Title 18 of the United States Code prohibits
electronic communications providers from disclosing the “record[s] or
other information pertaining to a subscriber… to any governmental
entity.”22 The physical location of a user’s cellphone is one example of
“other information.”23 An exception to this general prohibition permits
providers to voluntarily disclose subscriber information to the government
when the provider, “in good faith, believes that an emergency involving
danger of death or serious physical injury to any person requires disclosure
without delay.”24
Beyond these statutory requirements, which bind service providers,
government acquisition of subscriber information may be subject to
additional constitutional restraints imposed by the Fourth Amendment.25
Case law governing when a defendant has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in cellphone location data and other electronically stored
information held by third parties so as to trigger Fourth Amendment
protections, continuously evolves alongside society’s own privacy
expectations.26
Section A of this Part provides background on the basic protections
afforded by the Fourth Amendment and describes the exigent
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. Section B provides
a detailed summary of the development and erosion of the so-called “thirdparty doctrine” in parallel with changing technology and societal
expectations of privacy. Finally, Section C explores the origins and
purpose of the Stored Communications Act and the remedies it provides.

A. Fourth Amendment Protections and the Exigent Circumstances
Exception
The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches and
seizures” by the government.27 It ensures that “intrusion[s] by the police”
are not “arbitrary,”28 but instead are reasonable and subjected to adequate
22

18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3) (emphasis added).
United States v. Gilliam, 842 F.3d 801, 803 (2d Cir. 2016).
24
18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(4).
25
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (plurality opinion).
26
Id. at 2214–17.
27
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
28
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
23
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scrutiny.29
As such, searches conducted without a warrant are
presumptively unreasonable.30 This warrant requirement empowers an
impartial judge, and not the police, to decide which intrusions are
necessary based on a probable-cause standard.31 Because the “ultimate
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’” however,
exceptions to the warrant requirement do exist.32 Relevant here is the
exigent circumstances exception.33
When an exigency makes the need for police action “sufficiently
compelling,”34 a search without a warrant may be “objectively reasonable”
based on the totality of the circumstances.”35 The State bears the heavy
burden of showing such an exigency.36 Courts have found a valid showing
of exigent circumstances in a variety of factual scenarios, including those
involving a threat to police officers or the public.37
Courts have held that police are justified in conducting a warrantless
search to interrupt acts of continuing or potential violence.38 In Brigham
City v. Stewart, the Supreme Court of the United States held that exigent
circumstances justified a warrantless entry into the defendants’ home to
stop a physical altercation.39 The Court found that the subjective
motivations of the officers are irrelevant in determining the propriety of a
warrantless search, so long as circumstances allow for an objectively
reasonable determination that immediate action is required to prevent
violence or mitigate injury.40 Similarly, in United States v. Thomas, the
court held that exigent circumstances justified a warrantless search of a
recently occupied apartment to recover a weapon and ensure nobody was
left on the premises to use it against the officers or bystanders.41

29

Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971).
30
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 454–55; U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
31
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
32
Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403.
33
Id.
34
Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 148–49 (2013) (quoting Kentucky v.
King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011)).
35
Id. (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011)).
36
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984).
37
John Mark Huff, Warrantless Entries and Searches Under Exigent
Circumstances: Why are They Justified and What Types of Circumstances Are
Considered Exigent?, 87 UNIV. DET. L. REV. 373, 379 (2010).
38
See, e.g., Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 406.
39
Id. at 400.
40
Id. at 404–06.
41
372 F.3d 1173, 1175, 1177–78 (2004).
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Many exceptions to the warrant requirement must be applied based
on the totality of the circumstances of each individual case.42 Where
courts have been willing to delineate per se rules, they have often favored
the defendant’s privacy over the State’s right to search.43 Nevertheless,
the development of the third-party doctrine placed the retrieval of some
categories of information outside of the definition of a search entirely and
therefore outside the protections of the Fourth Amendment as well.44

B. What is a Search? Development and Erosion of the Third-Party
Doctrine
The question of whether government intrusion constituted a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment originally turned on an act
of physical trespass by government agents.45 Modern jurisprudence,
however, has evolved to protect more than merely a property interest in
the place to be searched.46 Later cases provided an alternate avenue for
determining whether a search had occurred, even when a physical trespass
had not,47 by asking if the individual had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the information sought.48 The Supreme Court articulated this
concept as a two-prong test in United States v. Katz, requiring both a
subjective expectation of privacy on the part of the person whose
information was to be searched and that this expectation be objectively
reasonable based on societal standards.49 Traditional third-party doctrine
provides a simple answer to the second prong: when information is
voluntarily disclosed to a third party, the source of the information, “takes
the risk … that [it] will be conveyed by that person to the government.”50
Accordingly, any reasonable expectation of privacy, and therefore any

42

Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 150–52, 150 n.3 (2013) (noting that while
the exigent circumstances exception is applied on a case-by-case basis, certain
categorical exceptions to the warrant requirement, such as for searches incident to
lawful arrest, also exist).
43
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2186 (2016); McNeely, 569 U.S.
at 145.
44
See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV.
561, 563 (2009) [hereinafter The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine].
45
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012).
46
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
47
Jones, 565 U.S. at 406, 409 (declining to decide whether a defendant had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the undercarriage of a vehicle because “the Katz
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy-test has been added to, not substituted for, the
common-law trespassory test.”).
48
Katz, 389 U.S. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring).
49
Id. at 361.
50
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
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Fourth Amendment protection requiring the government to seek a warrant,
is forfeit.51

1. Development of the Traditional Third-Party Doctrine
United States v. Miller, a seminal case applying the third-party
doctrine, held that a defendant indicted for tax fraud had no protectable
expectation of privacy in checks and other financial records held by banks
of which the defendant was a client, because the information was
voluntarily given to the bank and made regularly available to bank
employees.52
The Supreme Court soon extended the doctrine to telephone
records.53 Smith v. Maryland involved a prosecution for a robbery in
which, after robbing the victim, the defendant made threatening phone
calls to the victim’s home.54 Without a warrant, police requested, and the
telephone company installed, a pen register, which detected a call from the
defendant’s phone to the victim’s.55 In part due to evidence stemming
from the pen register, the defendant was later convicted.56 The Court
applied the Katz analysis in affirming the lower courts’ denial of the
defendant’s motion to suppress the fruits of the pen register.57
The Court reasoned that the defendant, aware the numbers he dialed
were conveyed to the phone company for a variety of purposes, including
potentially to aid law enforcement, likely lacked a subjective expectation
of privacy in those numbers.58 The Court noted specifically that the
defendant may have had an expectation of privacy in the actual content of
the call but that a pen register is incapable of recording such information.59
Regardless, and relying heavily on Miller, the Court held there was no
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers the defendant
dialed, as he assumed the risk that the phone company might turn them
over to the government.60 Because this type of information is conveyed to
the telephone company regardless of where a call originates, the Court
51

The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, supra note 44, at 574.
425 U.S. at 436, 442.
53
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979).
54
Id. at 737.
55
Id. At the time Smith was decided, federal law defined a pen register as a
device installed on landline telephones or phone wires to record the numbers dialed
by a target phone. Deborah F. Buckman, Allowable Use of Federal Pen Register and
Trap and Trace Device to Trace Cellphones and Internet Use, 15 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 537
§ 2 (2006).
56
Smith, 425 U.S. at 738.
57
Id. at 741.
58
Id. at 742–43.
59
Id. at 741, 743.
60
Id. at 743–44.
52
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rejected the argument that the defendant had a privacy interest merely
because he placed the call from within his own home.61 Based on the
foregoing analysis, the Court held that no search had occurred and that the
installation of the pen register without a warrant was proper.62
A related line of cases analyzed the Fourth Amendment implications
of electronically tracking the movements of a defendant when those
movements are exposed to the public.63 Early on, the Supreme Court held
that electronic surveillance of a defendant’s movements in public places
did not implicate the Fourth Amendment.64 In United States v. Knotts,
police attached a “beeper” to a canister of chloroform and used it to
augment physical surveillance of a defendant as he traveled on public
roads to a cabin used to manufacture illegal drugs.65 Relying in part on
Smith, the Court found that the defendant lacked a reasonable expectation
of privacy in his movements because they were exposed to public view,
both on the road and around the exterior of the cabin.66 The Court reasoned
that where electronic surveillance merely accomplished what would
otherwise be possible with visual surveillance of those locations, no
warrant was required.67
The Supreme Court tacitly acknowledged the lower court’s concern
that warrantless electronic tracking of private property might unreasonably
intrude into private areas protected by the Fourth Amendment,68 but found
that the beeper did not reveal any movements within the cabin and
therefore did not implicate any such constitutional concerns.69 In contrast,
however, the Court soon found that where a beeper revealed the location
of an object inside a home, and when the location could not otherwise be
ascertained from the outside, a search requiring a warrant had occurred.70

2. United States v. Jones and Erosion of the Third-Party Doctrine
Despite its robust jurisprudential foundation, including in its
application to changing telephone technology,71 the third-party doctrine
61

Id. at 743.
Id. at 745–46.
63
See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983).
64
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282.
65
Id. at 278, 281–82. The Court defined a “beeper” as a “radio transmitter …
which emits periodic signals that can be picked up by a radio receiver.” Id. at 277.
66
Id. at 285.
67
Id. at 282.
68
Id. at 285; United States v. Knotts, 662 F.2d 515, 518 (1981), rev’d, 460 U.S.
276 (1983).
69
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285.
70
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 709–10, 714 (1984).
71
See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979).
62
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has recently begun to erode under advances in surveillance techniques.72
In United States v. Jones, police affixed a GPS device to the underside of
a suspected drug trafficker’s vehicle and tracked him for twenty-eight
days.73 While officers had originally obtained a warrant for the device, the
warrant had expired by the time police placed the device on the vehicle.74
Though a plurality of the Court held that a search had occurred based on
the officers’ physical trespass on the defendant’s vehicle,75 five justices in
two concurring opinions held that even under a Katz analysis, tracking of
the kind employed in Jones would raise Fourth Amendment concerns.76
Justice Alito and three others, concurring in the judgment, reasoned
that long-term GPS tracking typically implicates reasonable expectations
of privacy in that such comprehensive and continuous monitoring
surpassed what could otherwise be reasonably accomplished with visual
surveillance, even where a defendant’s movements were public.77 Though
Justice Alito found that the twenty-eight days of tracking in the present
case constituted a search, he declined to define a specific threshold past
which Fourth Amendment protections might attach.78 Justice Sotomayor’s
concurrence, echoing the caution raised in Knotts, extended these concerns
to even short-term GPS monitoring.79 She noted that warrantless tracking
of devices such as cellphones may follow the devices’ owners into private
spaces and allow the government to trawl for vast quantities of information
regarding religious, medical, and sexual activities without the protections
of judicial oversight.80 In so doing, she questioned the basic application
of third-party doctrine to cell phones.81 These concurrences laid the
foundation for the Court’s decision in Carpenter.82
Along similar lines, and years before deciding Jones, the Supreme
Court held that law enforcement cannot circumvent a defendant’s
constitutional protections by employing sense-augmenting technology to

72

See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (plurality
opinion).
73
United States v. Jones, 656 U.S. 400, 403 (2012).
74
Id. at 402–03.
75
Id. at 403, 406–08.
76
Id. at 430 (Alito, J., with Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, JJ., concurring in the
judgment); id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
77
Id. at 429–30 (Alito, J., with Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, JJ., concurring in
the judgment).
78
Id. at 430.
79
Id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
80
Id. at 416.
81
Id. at 417.
82
ORIN S. KERR, Implementing Carpenter: The Digital Fourth Amendment,
(forthcoming
2018)
(manuscript
at
10),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3301257
[https://perma.cc/6YA6-74SU] [hereinafter Implementing Carpenter].
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gather information that could not otherwise be obtained without a physical
intrusion.83 In Kyllo v. United States, federal agents used a thermalimaging camera to locate heat emanating from marijuana grow lights
inside the defendant’s home.84 The device was not capable of showing
human figures and indeed showed little more than crude patches of heat.85
Nevertheless, the Court held that any information, however vague,
regarding activities within the home was sufficiently private to evoke
Fourth Amendment protections under the Katz framework.86
In support of this rule, the Court opined that even rough heat
signatures might reveal specific “intimate” and protectable activities.87
They further cautioned that a standard for defining a search based on a post
hoc review of what specific information was gathered would prevent law
enforcement from knowing in advance whether their activities would be
constitutional.88 Finally, the Court reasoned that a clear legal boundary
protecting the inside of the home anticipated the development of
increasingly sophisticated technology that might reveal more specific
human activity, information which even the dissent acknowledged was
worthy of constitutional protection.89 Accordingly, the Court held that any
State use of technology not available to the general public and permitting
“explor[ation]” of a “constitutionally protected area,”90 which could not
otherwise be accomplished without physically invading it, constituted a
search and therefore required a warrant.91
In the forty years since the Supreme Court decided Smith, the Court
has expanded the array of privacy interests covered by the Fourth
Amendment due to the increasingly detailed and invasive nature of
personal information stored by communications providers and on
cellphones in particular.92 In 2014, the Supreme Court narrowed the
search-incident-to-lawful-arrest exception to the warrant requirement by

83

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–35 (2001).
Id. at 29–30.
85
Id. at 31.
86
Id. at 35, 37.
87
Id. at 38 (discussing the example of “the lady of the house tak[ing] her daily
sauna and bath”).
88
Id. at 39.
89
Id. at 35–36 (noting that “the rule we adopt must take account of more
sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development.”); id. at 48 (Stevens,
J., with Rehnquist, CJ. and O’Connor and Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
90
Id. at 34 (majority opinion); id. at 40 (Stevens, J., with Rehnquist, CJ. and
O’Connor and Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
91
Id. at 40 (majority opinion).
92
See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216–17 (2018)
(plurality opinion).
84
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holding that police must generally obtain a warrant before searching data
stored on a cellphone seized incident to arrest.93
In Riley v. California, officers searched a defendant’s smartphone for
evidence of gang-related criminal activity after he was arrested for
firearms possession during a routine car stop.94 The Court found that
though a cellphone is often found within reach of a defendant at the time
of arrest, a search of the data stored on it falls outside the purposes of the
traditional rule for searches incident to arrest.95 Specifically, the Court
found that searching the contents of a phone served neither the
governmental interest in ensuring officer safety nor in preventing the
destruction of evidence.96 The Court reasoned that data could not
reasonably be harmful to officers and enumerated several ways in which
officers could prevent the destruction or concealment of evidentiary
materials stored on a phone without searching it immediately.97
Moreover, the Court reasoned that though suspects have a reduced
expectation of privacy while in custody, a search of cellphone data far
exceeded the minimal “additional intrusion” imposed by a search of a
suspect’s person and effects.98 A cellphone, they reasoned, might contain
vast data in the form of communications, photos, and videos, which could
give a near-complete picture of a suspect’s life indefinitely into the past.99
The Court expressed particular concern over certain categories of
information related to “private interests,” such as medical inquiries and a
person’s location history, which might reveal protected religious, political,

93
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401–02 (2014) (per curiam) (also
contemplating that, in limited situations, officers might rely on exigent circumstances
or another case-by-case exception to search cellphone data without a warrant after
making an arrest).
94
Id. at 378–80.
95
Id. at 385–86. Assessing the validity of warrantless searches in general
requires balancing the degree of intrusion into the subject’s privacy against the need
to protect government interests advanced by the search. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526
U.S. 295, 300 (1999). Searches incident to arrest specifically weigh the defendant’s
significantly reduced expectation of privacy while in custody against the
government’s dual interests in promptly recovering weapons that might be used to
harm officers and evidence that might be readily concealed or destroyed. Riley, 573
U.S. at 385–86; Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). Accordingly, the
traditional and enduring rule remains that the search incident to arrest must not exceed
the area within the “immediate control” and reach of the defendant. Chimel, 395 U.S.
at 763.
96
Riley, 573 U.S. at 387–88.
97
Id. at 387–91 (describing methods such as turning the phone off or placing it
in a Faraday bag to prevent the remote wiping of the phone’s contents and suggesting
disabling the phone’s locking feature to prevent evidence from becoming
irretrievable).
98
Id. at 393.
99
Id. at 394.
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and other activities.100 Considering the profound level of intrusion into a
defendant’s privacy against the minimal potential to further governmental
interests,101 the Court concluded that, categorically, absent a case-by-case
warrant exception such as exigent circumstances, an officer’s obligation
before searching a phone “seized incident to arrest is … simple—get a
warrant.”102

3. Electronic Location Data and the New Age of Carpenter
Drawing on the aforementioned cases, the Supreme Court decided
Carpenter v. United States and specifically repudiated the third-party
doctrine with regard to historical cellphone-location data.103 In Carpenter,
federal prosecutors obtained two court orders compelling the defendant’s
cellphone-service provider to surrender respectively 127 days and seven
days of historical cell-site location information (“CSLI”) in order to tie the
defendant to a four-month string of robberies.104
Based upon the substantial volume of information collected and the
fact that a cellphone readily enters private, constitutionally protected
spaces, the Court held that historical CSLI provides so comprehensive a
picture of a defendant’s life as to create a reasonable expectation of
privacy.105 Reasoning that this level of intrusion could not have been
imagined at the time the third-party doctrine was fashioned, the Court
noted that cellphone location data is passively siphoned from a user instead
of actively and voluntarily shared, like the dialed phone numbers in
Smith.106 The Court further highlighted the Jones concurrences, which
reasoned that comprehensive tracking of even public movements might
constitute a search.107

100
Id. at 395–96 (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 414–15 (2012)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
101
Id. at 396.
102
Id. at 402–03.
103
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (plurality opinion).
104
Id. at 2212. The second order resulted in the production of only two days of
records. Id. The records were obtained pursuant to a provision of the Stored
Communications Act that required disclosure based upon court orders issued after a
showing lower than the probable cause required to obtain a search warrant. Id.; see
infra Section II-C.
105
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219. CSLI triangulates a cellphone’s location based
on the phone’s connection to nearby cell sites. Id. at 2211, 2219. As a result, the
accuracy of CSLI depends on the concentration of cell sites in the phone’s vicinity.
Id. At the time Carpenter was decided, CSLI, which was accurate to within fifty
meters, had not even reached the level of precision provided by GPS data. Id. at 2219.
106
Id. at 2220.
107
Id. at 2219–20.
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Even though CSLI is disclosed to a service provider in the regular
course of using a cellphone, and even though many of the defendant’s
movements may have been public, technological innovation had reframed
societal standards regarding a reasonable expectation of privacy and
rendered the third-party doctrine inapplicable to government requests for
historical CSLI.108 The Court therefore opined that a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in, “the record of his physical
movements as captured through CSLI.”109 Leaving open the possibility
that the government might, in limited circumstances, rely on an exception
such as exigent circumstances to obtain CSLI without a warrant, the Court
held that, under the Katz framework, a demand for seven, and certainly
127 days’ worth of CSLI constituted a search.110
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Gorsuch agreed with the plurality
that traditional third-party doctrine could not be extended to cover CSLI
and other customer information stored electronically by service
providers.111 He went further, however, rejecting the Katz framework
entirely in his Fourth Amendment analysis of CSLI. Returning instead to
protections rooted in property law, Justice Gorsuch imagined that
providers held a customer’s data as an “involuntary bailment,” in which
the customer retains a constitutionally protectable ownership interest.112
As such, the customer would not surrender all Fourth Amendment
protections in information entrusted to a third party,113 and these
protections would remain intact regardless of whether the information
must be turned over as a condition of service.114
The Carpenter Court specifically declined to extend its ruling to other
forms of information collection, including real-time CSLI tracking.115
Therefore, while Carpenter significantly narrowed the scope of the thirdparty doctrine as applied to cellphone location records, lower courts have
been free to hold that factual situations on the fringes of Carpenter fail to
raise Fourth Amendment protections.116

C. The Stored Communications Act and Its Remedies
The Stored Communications Act was enacted in 1986 as Title II of
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”), which provided

108

Id. at 2217, 2223.
Id. at 2217.
110
Id. at 2217 & n.3, 2223.
111
Id. at 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
112
Id. at 2270.
113
Id. at 2269.
114
Id. at 2270.
115
Id. at 2220 (plurality opinion).
116
See United States v. Howard, 426 F. Supp. 3d 1247, 1257 (M.D. Ala. 2019).
109
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amendments to the Wiretap Act of 1968 designed to protect electronic
communications from unlawful interception and disclosure.117
Application of the traditional third-party doctrine to changing technology,
specifically electronic data increasingly stored by private
telecommunications companies, had created gaps in Fourth Amendment
protections.118 The newly-enacted provisions of the SCA were intended
keep pace with these changes and fill the gaps.119 The same reasoning was
later extended to information in the possession of Internet Service
Providers (“ISPs”).120 The bill sought to enact “clear standards” to shield
police from liability, preserve the “admissibility of evidence,” and,
significantly, stop the “gradual erosion” of the constitutional right to
privacy.121 The ECPA eventually passed both houses of Congress with
strong support from the United States Department of Justice.122 The
emergency disclosure provision in § 2702(c)(4), which permits a
communications provider to voluntarily disclose certain user data to the
government in the face of a threat to life or limb,123 was not included in
the original bill and was added later as part of the USA PATRIOT Act in
2001.124
The ECPA generally was inspired in part by a letter from the Justice
Department’s Criminal Division to one of the senators who later
introduced a version of the bill.125 The letter suggested that electronic
communications were protected from “unauthorized acquisition only
where a reasonable expectation of privacy exists.”126 In the face of newly
developed communication modalities, however, when such a reasonable
expectation existed was unclear.127
Case law up to that point suggested that users of electronic
communications services may not have the required reasonable privacy
expectation in the information and communications they disclosed to their

117

S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1, 25 (1986).
See id. at 3, 5.
119
See id. at 1–3, 5.
120
Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a
Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1210 (2004)
[hereinafter A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act].
121
S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 5.
122
H.R.4952 – Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/99th-congress/house-bill/4952/allactions?overview=closed#tabs [https://perma.cc/3VJM-DTR3] (last visited Nov. 20,
2020); S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 4.
123
18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(4).
124
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 284.
125
S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 2, 4.
126
Id.
127
Id.
118
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service providers by virtue of using these services.128 These decisions left
no clear answer as to whether Fourth Amendment protections attached to
this type of information when held by these third-party providers.129 Even
if the Fourth Amendment were applicable, however, courts had
traditionally permitted government agencies to gain access to this
information through the use of subpoenas and court orders issued on
requirements less stringent than the probable cause standard against which
warrant applications are judged.130
Courts generally held these subpoenas to be compatible with an
individual’s Fourth Amendment rights unless the subpoena was overbroad
in its request for records.131 A subpoena may not have been overbroad
unless it sought information that was irrelevant or vague, or it was “unduly
burdensome” to the recipient.132 Therefore, where information was held
by a third-party electronic communication provider, the government could
compel disclosure of the information via subpoena instead of by means of
“a warrant based on probable cause.”133 Finally, as a private entity, an
electronic communication provider could itself search the
communications and information of a user and disclose them voluntarily
to a government agency free from the Fourth Amendment constraints
applicable to state actors.134
The SCA regulates some of the aforementioned contingencies.135 It
restricts disclosure of subscriber communications and information by
public providers of remote computing services and electronic
communication services.136 Under the SCA, an electronic communication
service is any entity which allows users to send or receive “electronic
communications,” defined elsewhere as the transfer of signals by radio or
various other electronic means.137 Notably, this definition does not include
wire or oral communications, the interception and disclosure of which are
governed by separate statutes;138 it does, however, cover other forms of
electronic communication such as e-mail.139

128

A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, supra note 120, at 1210–

11.
129

Id. at 1211.
Id.
131
Id.
132
In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 1973).
133
A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, supra note 120, at 1211.
134
Id. at 1212.
135
18 U.S.C. §§ 2702–03.
136
18 U.S.C. § 2702(a).
137
18 U.S.C. § 2510(12), (15).
138
18 U.S.C. § 2511.
139
See A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, supra note 120, at
130

1211.
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The SCA restricts disclosure of information differently based on
whether the disclosure is voluntary or compelled by a government
agency.140 Section 2702 generally prohibits electronic communication
service providers from voluntarily disclosing the contents of stored
electronic communications, as well as any “record or other information
pertaining to” a user of the provider’s service.141 The section then
enumerates several carveouts, which allow the voluntary disclosure of
either the contents of an electronic communication or of a record or other
information pertaining to a user.142 For the purposes of § 2702, the
physical location of a cellphone, when stored by a cellphone service
provider, is a protected form of “other information.”143
Exceptions allowing the disclosure of records or other information
include consent of the subscriber and situations in which disclosure is
necessary to protect the property of the provider.144 Moreover, the SCA
allows for free disclosure of records or other information to
nongovernmental entities.145 Disclosure of such information to the
government, however, is restricted under § 2702(c)(4) to circumstances in
which, “the provider, in good faith, believes that an emergency involving
danger of death or serious physical injury” requires immediate disclosure
of information related to the exigency.146 The relatively stringent
restrictions on disclosure to a governmental entity as compared to a
nongovernmental entity reflect the congressional effort to prevent the
“gradual erosion” of Fourth Amendment protections against government
intrusion.147
Section 2703 enumerates restrictions on the government’s ability to
compel disclosure of the contents of electronic communications and other
subscriber information and records from providers by several means,
including by warrant, subpoena, or other court order.148 Carpenter, and
other lower-court decisions, however, have held that § 2703 violates the
Fourth Amendment when applied to historical CSLI and other categories
of electronically stored information.149
Moreover, while the
140

Compare 18 U.S.C § 2702 (voluntary disclosures), with § 2703 (compelled
disclosures).
141
18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1), (3).
142
18 U.S.C. § 2702(b), (c).
143
United States v. Gilliam, 842 F.3d 801, 803 (2d Cir. 2016).
144
18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(2)–(3).
145
18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(6).
146
18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(4).
147
S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 5 (1986).
148
18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)–(c).
149
See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018) (plurality
opinion) (explaining that, “an order issued under Section 2703(d) of the Act is not a
permissible mechanism for accessing historical cell-site records. Before compelling a
wireless carrier to turn over a subscriber’s CSLI, the Government’s obligation is a
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constitutionality of § 2703 under the Fourth Amendment may be relevant
for assessing the constitutionality of related provisions of the SCA, this
Note primarily considers voluntary disclosure of records and other
information pertaining to an electronic communication service subscriber
under § 2702.
Finally, later sections of the SCA provide a series of remedies for
violations of the Act.150 Section 2707 provides for a right of civil action
against any entity other than the government, including providers, who
knowingly or intentionally violate SCA provisions.151 It also provides an
avenue for administrative discipline against government agents for similar
violations.152 Section 2712 mirrors § 2707, but provides for civil action
against the government for “willful violation[s]” of the SCA and related
statutes,”153 and specifies that such civil action is the exclusive remedy
against the government for “any claims within the purview of this
section.”154 As § 2702 restricts the actions of providers, however, and not
those of the government directly, it is not clear that even § 2712’s
exclusive remedies against the government would apply to unauthorized
disclosure of records or other information under § 2702.155 Interestingly,
§ 2708 comprises a separate, but broader exclusivity-of-remedies
provision, providing that any remedies enumerated in the SCA are the
exclusive remedies for any “nonconstitutional” violations of the Act.156
Against the backdrop of traditional Fourth Amendment law, and the
evolution of the third-party doctrine through Carpenter, lower courts have
continued to rule on the propriety of law-enforcement efforts to secure
short-term, live tracking of criminal suspects’ cellphones under the
emergency provision of § 2702(c)(4).157

III. WHEN SHORT-TERM, LIVE TRACKING OF A CELLPHONE DOES
NOT REQUIRE A WARRANT
This Part explores recent lower court decisions regarding the shortterm, live tracking of cellphones to facilitate the apprehension of wanted
criminals. Section A describes cases in which courts held such tracking

familiar one—get a warrant.”); United States v. Ramirez, 471 F. Supp. 3d 354, 359
(D. Mass. 2020) (recognizing Carpenter’s effect on orders under section 2703(d) when
involving CSLI).
150
18 U.S.C. §§ 2707, 2708, 2712.
151
18 U.S.C. § 2707(a).
152
18 U.S.C. § 2707(d).
153
18 U.S.C. § 2712(a).
154
18 U.S.C. § 2712(d).
155
18 U.S.C. §§ 2702, 2712.
156
18 U.S.C. § 2708.
157
See infra Part III.
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does not constitute a search at all, while Section B describes those in which
exigent circumstances were found to justify the tracking, regardless of
whether a search occurred. In the shadow of Carpenter, these cases
illustrate the incongruous treatment of such tracking under the Fourth
Amendment, when compared with other forms of electronic surveillance
upon which the Supreme Court has already rendered decisions.

A. Short-Term, Real-Time GPS Tracking of a Cellphone May Not
Constitute a Search Within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment
As noted above, the traditional third-party doctrine vitiated Fourth
Amendment protections when an individual “voluntarily turn[ed] [certain
information] over to third parties,” including metadata stored by a
telephone company when a subscriber used the company’s service.158
Defendants may also lack a privacy interest in their physical location when
they travel on “public thoroughfares” and so voluntarily subject their
movements to public scrutiny.159 While the Supreme Court has already
held that acquisition of long-term, historical CSLI constitutes a search,160
no binding opinion has yet ruled on whether short-term, real-time GPS
tracking does as well.161
The pre-Carpenter decisions of some lower courts, however, have
held that this type of tracking does not constitute a search because a
defendant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in otherwise public
movements.162 In United States v. Skinner, federal authorities tracked a
suspected drug trafficker along public highways for three days using GPS
data from his cellphone before apprehending him at a rest stop. 163 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that this did not
reveal such comprehensive information as to implicate Fourth
Amendment privacy concerns because the tracking was relatively brief
and did not disclose any information that could not have been reasonably
ascertained through visual observation.164 On these grounds, the court
held the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the “signal

158

Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979).
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983).
160
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018) (plurality opinion).
161
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) (Alito, J., with Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Kagan, JJ., concurring in the judgment); id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
162
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219–20; United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772,
781 (6th Cir. 2012) (superseded by regulation on unrelated grounds pertaining to the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines as noted in United States v. Penny, 777 Fed. App’x 142,
151 (6th Cir. 2019)).
163
Skinner, 690 F.3d at 776, 778, 780.
164
Id. at 778, 780.
159
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emanating from his phone,” despite the fact that police had never
physically surveilled him before his arrest.165
Similarly, in United States v. Riley, federal agents tracked the
cellphone of a suspected armed robber for approximately seven hours after
obtaining a warrant for his arrest, but no search warrant for his phone.166
Using GPS information, officers tracked the defendant to a motel, and only
then determined his precise location and room number by asking an
employee.167 Relying on the Supreme Court’s contrast between Knotts
and United States v. Karo, the court reasoned that because the tracking,
which persisted for even less time than in Skinner, revealed only the
defendant’s otherwise public movements, and not his movements within
the motel room itself, it did not amount to a search under the Katz
framework.168
While the majority opinion noted the district court’s reliance on the
prior issuance of an arrest warrant to justify the GPS tracking,169 the arrest
warrant did not meaningfully factor into the panel’s holdings. In a
concurring opinion, however, one judge noted that, while GPS tracking
sufficiently precise to detect the defendant’s location or movements within
a home or specific motel room might ordinarily amount to a search, it
should not when the defendant was already subject to a valid arrest
warrant.170 This concurrence noted that officers may already enter a home
subject to an arrest warrant issued on probable cause when they reasonably
suspect the defendant to be inside.171 By analogy, the concurrence
reasoned, officers armed with an arrest warrant should be able to conduct
what would otherwise amount to a search of a defendant’s cellphone
location data, even if it would reveal the defendant’s precise movements
within a constitutionally protected space, provided they reasonably
suspect the defendant to be in possession of the phone.172
Post-Carpenter opinions, however, illustrate the confusion the latter
decision infused into lower-court determinations related to GPS
tracking.173 In United States v. Howard, police received consent from a
confidential informant to place a GPS tracker on her truck, which she
165

Id. at 775, 779; see also United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 278, 280

(1983).
166

United States v. Riley, 858 F.3d 1012, 1013 (6th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
Note that GPS data in this case were obtained pursuant to a court order under § 2703
of the SCA as opposed to the emergency provisions under § 2702(c)(4). Id. at 1014.
167
Id. at 1013.
168
Id. at 1017–18.
169
Id. at 1016.
170
Id. at 1019–20 (Boggs, J., concurring).
171
Id. at 1020 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602–03 (1980)).
172
Id. (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602–03 (1980)).
173
See, e.g., United States v. Howard, 426 F. Supp. 3d 1247, 1251 (M.D. Ala.
2019).
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subsequently lent to a suspected methamphetamine dealer.174 Police
tracked the defendant on exclusively public roads for just under twentyfour hours before arresting him and without performing direct visual
surveillance.175 The court ultimately held that, as in Knotts, the defendant
had no reasonable expectation of privacy because his movements were
tracked live during only a single trip on public roads.176 In its opinion,
however, the court discussed the complexity introduced by the holding in
Carpenter that, under the right circumstances, a defendant might have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his physical movements as
documented by electronic tracking, even where many of those movements
were otherwise public.177 In particular, the court recognized that, in
explicitly declining to rule on live tracking using GPS, Carpenter left
lower courts with little clear guidance in assessing electronic
surveillance.178
The court considered factors from prior decisions, such as the
duration of tracking, whether the data gathered were live or historical, and
the ability of the tracking device to enter constitutionally protected
spaces.179 Because the instant defendant was tracked for a relatively short
period, in real time, and using a vehicle in public, the data collected failed
to impinge on several of the privacy concerns raised in Carpenter.180 The
court reasoned, however, that the GPS tracking of a cellphone might, as in
Karo and Carpenter, lead police impermissibly into spaces protected by
the Fourth Amendment.181 The holding in Carpenter, the court
acknowledged, inched the Supreme Court closer to “revisiting” Knotts.182
Recent decisions at the appellate and district levels suggest a general
tendency by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit to
align with the Sixth Circuit, as in Skinner, above.183 In United States v.
McHenry, the court noted in dictum, “substantial doubt that [the
defendant] had a reasonable expectation of privacy in cellphone location
information voluntarily provided” to his cellular carrier.184 Similarly, in
174

Id. at 1249–50.
Id. at 1250.
176
Id. at 1257.
177
Id. at 1254; Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018)
(plurality opinion).
178
Howard, 426 F. Supp. 3d at 1254.
179
Id. at 1257.
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
Id. at 1258.
183
See, e.g., United States v. McHenry, 849 F.3d 699, 706 (8th Cir. 2017) (citing
Skinner, 690 F.3d at 777–81); United States v. Sauceda, No. 4:16-CR-40083-01-KES,
2017 WL 4676606, at *10 (D.S.D. Sept. 27, 2017).
184
849 F.3d at 706. Interestingly, the Court in McHenry references the
defendant’s disclosure of his cellphone’s location to his wireless provider, raising the
175
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United States v. Sauceda, police fearful for the safety of a confidential
informant made an emergency request to a suspected drug dealer’s
cellphone provider for the provider to “ping” the GPS on the defendant’s
cellphone.185 Though police obtained the relevant GPS tracking data
without a search warrant, a separate warrant had previously been issued to
track another of the defendant’s cellphones, which was no longer
registered to him at the time police attempted to execute the search.186
Further, just before pinging the defendant’s phone pursuant to the
emergency request, officers secured a warrant for the defendant’s arrest.187
Using pings from the emergency request, officers tracked the
defendant to the vicinity of a hotel where he was apprehended.188 As in
United States v. Riley, GPS tracking led officers only to the hotel itself, at
which point they relied on traditional surveillance and interviews with
hotel staff to ascertain the defendant’s precise location.189 The court found
that the warrantless GPS tracking of the defendant’s cellphone did not
constitute a search.190 Though the court discussed factors raised in Skinner
and United States v. Riley, including the short duration of the tracking and
the fact that it revealed no information from inside a home or hotel
room,191 the court’s opinion entirely adopted the concurrence in United
States v. Riley.192 Specifically, the court held that the defendant had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his location, regardless of the
characteristics of the electronic tracking used to locate him, because a
warrant had been issued for his arrest before police pinged his phone.193
While Carpenter suggests a trend towards recognizing an expanded
expectation of privacy in cellphone location data obtained from third
parties,194 courts in the Eighth and surrounding circuits have allowed the
short-term, real-time GPS tracking of cellphones without a search warrant
specter of traditional third-party doctrine in Smith. Id. In so doing, however, the Court
cites Skinner, wherein the decision rested instead on the defendant’s disclosure of his
location to the general public, which therefore could have been ascertained by police
without the assistance of electronic tracking. Skinner, 690 F.3d at 778.
185
2017 WL 4676606, at *4.
186
Id.
187
Id. at *5.
188
Id. at *4–5.
189
Id. at *5.
190
Id. at *10.
191
Id. at *6–7.
192
Id. at *7, 10 (“It is not necessary in this instance for this court to determine
whether Skinner rules the day, or whether the Eighth Circuit might adopt the Skinner
analysis if faced squarely with the question.”).
193
Id. at *9–10 (quoting United States v. Patrick, 842 F.3d 540, 545 (7th Cir.
2016)) (“A person wanted on probable cause (and an arrest warrant) who is taken into
custody in a public place, where he had no legitimate expectation of privacy, cannot
complain about how the police learned his location.”).
194
Implementing Carpenter, supra note 82 (manuscript at 1, 8).
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in public places and seem willing to allow it when the tracking enters
private spaces as well when an arrest warrant has already been issued.195
It is unclear, however, what effect Carpenter might have on any future
ruling on this subject by the Eighth Circuit.

B. Short-Term, Real-Time GPS Tracking Without a Warrant,
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(4) May Be Justified by Exigent
Circumstances
As noted above, police must generally obtain a warrant before
undertaking a search, subject to limited exceptions.196
Exigent
circumstances provide such an exception when, “lives are threatened, [or]
a suspect’s escape is imminent.”197 Section 2702(c)(4) similarly allows
providers to disclose cellphone location data to the government when the
provider believes there is a danger of injury or death.198 Courts have
found, in a variety of circumstances, that these constitutional and statutory
standards coalesce into a single analysis.199 Short-term, real-time,
warrantless tracking of a cellphone may therefore be justified by exigent
circumstances and, when it is, disclosure under § 2702(c)(4) will generally
also be proper.200
Several courts have found that exigent circumstances justified the
short-term, real-time tracking of a cellphone without a warrant under
§2702(c)(4) to protect victims of human trafficking.201 In United States v.
Gilliam, the court upheld warrantless tracking of a defendant’s cellphone
over a single day to find a child trafficked for sex work and effect the
defendant’s arrest after police located him on a New York City street
corner.202 Considering both the statutory and constitutional exigency
provisions in one analysis,203 the court found that forced sex work itself
exposed the minor to a sufficiently “significant risk of serious bodily
injury” that exigent circumstances justified warrantless tracking of the
195

United States v. Riley, 858 F.3d 1012, 1017–18 (6th Cir. 2017) (per curiam);
id. at 1020 (Boggs, J., concurring); United States v. McHenry, 849 F.3d 699, 706 (8th
Cir. 2017); Sauceda, 2017 WL 4676606, at *9–10.
196
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 (2014).
197
United States v. Ball, 90 F.3d 260, 263 (8th Cir. 1996).
198
18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(4).
199
See, e.g., United States v. Gilliam, 842 F.3d 801, 804 (2d Cir. 2016).
200
See, e.g., id at 804–05.
201
United States v. McHenry, 849 F.3d 699, 706 (8th Cir. 2017); Gilliam, 842
F.3d at 804 (2d Cir. 2016).
202
842 F.3d at 802, 804.
203
Id. at 804 (“Both the second statutory issue [of whether or not the emergency
provision of § 2702(c)(4) was satisfied] and the Fourth Amendment issue turn on
whether the circumstances known to law enforcement and present to Sprint were
within the category of ‘exigent circumstances’ that permit warrantless searches.”).
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cellphone.204 The court further noted that the defendant’s cell service
provider therefore had a good faith basis for releasing the tracking data to
police under § 2702(c)(4).205
Similarly, in McHenry, police used an emergency GPS tracking
request under § 2702(c)(4) to warrantlessly trace a cellphone used to
facilitate the sex trafficking of a minor.206 On the same day, police went
to the motel where the phone was located and ascertained the precise
location of the victim and defendant by speaking with motel staff.207
Citing Gilliam, the court held that exigent circumstances justified the
relevant cell service provider in releasing GPS location data to police.208
Courts have also permitted such tracking to locate suspected
perpetrators of violent crimes.209 In United States v. Andrews, police made
an emergency request under § 2702(c)(4) to track the cellphone of a
defendant with an lengthy criminal history, suspected of committing two
shootings on the day in question, and believed to still be armed.210 Police
monitored the defendant remotely for approximately seven hours before
arresting him.211 The District Court held that these circumstances justified
both disclosure of the location data to police under the SCA and tracking
of the cellphone without a warrant.212
In United States v. Takai, police sought a defendant suspected in two
similar robberies committed on the same day, one of which involved a
shooting.213 Fearing the defendant might attempt another robbery and
believing him to still pose a danger to the public, police obtained
emergency GPS tracking data for the defendant’s cellphone under §
2702(c)(4) without a warrant.214 Within a day, police located and arrested
the defendant.215 As in Andrews, the court held that the circumstances
permitted disclosure of the tracking data to police under § 2702(c)(4) and,
separately, that it was proper for police to obtain the data without a
warrant under the traditional exigent circumstances exception.216 The
Takai court added, however, that “even if the court were required to find”
that tracking the defendant’s phone without a warrant “violat[ed] the …
204

Id.
Id. at 805.
206
McHenry, 849 F.3d at 702.
207
Id.
208
Id. at 706.
209
United States v. Andrews, 381 F. Supp. 3d 1044, 1063 (D. Minn. 2019);
United States v. Takai, 943 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1322–23 (D. Utah 2013).
210
381 F. Supp. 3d at 1049–51.
211
Id. at 1049–52.
212
Id. at 1063.
213
943 F. Supp. 2d at 1317–18.
214
Id. at 1318, 1320.
215
Id. at 1318.
216
Id. at 1322–23.
205
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Fourth Amendment,” suppression of the resulting evidence would be an
improper remedy based on the officers’ “good faith reliance” on the
emergency provision of the SCA.217
Finally, courts have found exigent circumstances where there is an
articulable danger to law-enforcement officers or agents.218 In United
States v. Caraballo, when police suspected that the defendant committed
a murder because of the victim’s cooperation with law enforcement,219
officers sought emergency GPS location data without a warrant, under §
2702(c)(4).220 Exigent circumstances justified tracking the defendant’s
cellphone for about two hours to apprehend him in a public place, because
police were concerned the defendant was still armed and that other officers
and informants might be in danger.221 In Sauceda, the defendant sought
to meet with a confidential informant to retrieve drugs and money, which,
unbeknownst to him, had already been seized from the informant by
police.222 Exigent circumstances justified pinging the defendant’s
cellphone, presumably pursuant to § 2702(c)(4),223 to effect his arrest
before the meeting, based on concerns that the defendant might have
known the informant was working with police.224
Exigent circumstances may therefore excuse the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement for short-term, real-time tracking of a cellphone by
GPS.225 When this is the case, the emergency requirements of § 2702(c)(4)
are generally also satisfied to permit disclosure by cellphone service
providers.226 The courts’ treatment of the underlying constitutional nature
of such tracking in the cases above, however, reveals several internal
inconsistencies. Notably, in light of finding exigent circumstances – and
in Sauceda, the presence of an arrest warrant as well – most of the courts
either failed to,227 or explicitly declined to answer the thornier

217

Id. at 1323–24 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)); United
States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 389 (D. Md. 2012).
218
United States v. Caraballo, 831 F.3d 95, 105 (2d Cir. 2016); United States v.
Sauceda, No. 4:16-CR-40083-01-KES, 2017 WL 4676606, at *13 (D.S.D. Sept. 27,
2017).
219
831 F.3d at 105.
220
Id. at 99.
221
Id. at 98, 100, 104.
222
2017 WL 4676606, at *11–12.
223
Id. at *12.
224
Id. at *12–13 (alternative justification to the court’s ruling, as noted above,
that, under the circumstances, tracking the defendant’s cellphone did not violate his
Fourth Amendment interests at all).
225
See United States v. Gilliam, 842 F.3d 801, 804 (2d Cir. 2016).
226
See id. at 805; United States v. Andrews, 381 F. Supp. 3d 1044, 1062–63 (D.
Minn. 2019).
227
Andrews, 381 F. Supp. 3d at 1062–63; United States v. Takai, 943 F. Supp.
2d 1315, 1321–23 (D. Utah 2013).
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constitutional question of whether the GPS tracking described would
otherwise constitute a search at all.228 The Gilliam court assumed that
Fourth Amendment protections applied to cellphone location data, but did
not specifically analyze the issue.229 The court in Caraballo, meanwhile,
appeared to vacillate, repeatedly referring to tracking the phone as “the
search,”230 and noting that, despite the presence of exigent circumstances,
seeking a warrant would have been “preferable.”231 The court nevertheless
described the defendant’s privacy interest in his location as “dubious at
best,”232 but ultimately, rendered no firm decision on the issue, finding in
the end, “at most … a limited intrusion into [the defendant’s] privacy
interests.”233
Either way, there is no statutory remedy against the government to
suppress information improperly disclosed by a communications provider
under § 2702, and injured parties are limited to a private action against the
provider.234 Therefore, if the Fourth Amendment is not applicable,
evidence obtained under § 2702(c)(4) cannot be suppressed as the product
of an improper search, even if a court finds the emergency conditions of
that section have not been met.235
Courts may find that the short-term, real-time tracking of a cellphone
in a public place, using GPS location data held by a cellular provider is not
subject to the protections of the Fourth Amendment,236 in particular when
an arrest warrant has previously issued.237
Regardless, exigent
circumstances may justify such tracking to locate suspected criminals and
also permit disclosure of the data by cell service providers under the §
2702(c)(4) emergency provision.238

228

United States v. McHenry, 849 F.3d 699, 706 (8th Cir. 2017); Sauceda, 2017
WL 4676606, at *13.
229
Gilliam, 842 F.3d at 804 n.2.
230
United States v. Caraballo, 831 F.3d 95, 103, 105 (2d Cir. 2016).
231
Id. at 105 n.9 (suggesting that officers both seek a warrant and ask the
cellphone provider to “apply[] its emergency process.”).
232
Id. at 105.
233
Id. at 106.
234
United States v. Beckett, 369 Fed. App’x. 52, 55–56 (11th Cir. 2010); 18
U.S.C § 2707(a); § 2708.
235
See People v. Moorer, 959 N.Y.S.2d 868, 875–76, 879 (Co. Ct. 2013).
236
See, e.g., United States v. Riley, 858 F.3d 1012, 1017–18 (6th Cir. 2017) (per
curiam).
237
See, e.g., United States v. Sauceda, No. 4:16-CR-40083-01-KES, 2017 WL
4676606, at *9–10 (D.S.D. Sept. 27, 2017).
238
See, e.g., United States v. Andrews, 381 F. Supp. 3d 1044, 1063 (D. Minn.
2019).
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IV. DISCUSSION: SHORT-TERM, REAL-TIME TRACKING OF
CELLPHONES UNDER § 2702(C)(4) SHOULD CONSTITUTE A SEARCH
If the discussion above appears convoluted, that sentiment is shared
by the courts.239 From the inconsistencies in the case law, however,
several general principles emerge: (1) the longer tracking persists, the
more likely it is to constitute a search;240 (2) tracking that is “retrospective”
is more likely to constitute a search than tracking that is live or
prospective;241 (3) when tracking crosses out of public areas and provides
information from inside a space, such as the home, that is protected by an
expectation of privacy society has traditionally recognized as reasonable,
the tracking is likely to constitute a search;242 (4) where a valid arrest
warrant has been issued, a defendant may lose any reasonable expectation
of privacy in his or her physical location, regardless of the foregoing
factors;243 (5) when tracking is found to be constitutionally sufficient, the
emergency provision contained in § 2702(c)(4) generally permits service
providers to disclose a subscriber’s GPS location data to police;244 (6)
where the Fourth Amendment does not apply, the SCA does not
independently provide for suppression of GPS data improperly obtained
by the government.245
These observations, however, do not provide direct guidance on the
proper constitutional treatment of short-term, real-time GPS tracking
pursuant to § 2702(c)(4). In this vacuum, some lower courts have found
that such tracking does not constitute a search,246 and, alternatively, that if
a search had occurred, it might be justified by the exigent circumstances
exception to the warrant requirement.247 These holdings, however, should
be reconsidered; even short-term GPS tracking of a cellphone might

239
See United States v. Howard, 426 F. Supp. 3d 1247, 1254 (M.D. Ala. 2019)
(noting that in analyzing electronic surveillance after Carpenter, district “courts like
this one are left to decide just how long is a piece of string.”).
240
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (plurality opinion);
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) (Alito, J., with Ginsburg, Breyer,
and Kagan, JJ., concurring in the judgment); id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
241
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218; Howard, 426 F. Supp. 3d at 1257.
242
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217; Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001); United States v. Karo,
468 U.S. 705, 709–10, 714 (1984); Howard, 426 F. Supp. 3d at 1257.
243
United States v. Riley, 858 F.3d 1012, 1020 (6th Cir. 2017) (Boggs, J.,
concurring) (per curiam); United States v. Sauceda, No. 4:16-CR-40083-01-KES,
2017 WL 4676606, at *10 (D.S.D. Sept. 27, 2017).
244
See, e.g., United States v. Andrews, 381 F. Supp. 3d 1044, 1063 (D. Minn.
2019).
245
People v. Moorer, 959 N.Y.S.2d 868, 876, 879 (Co. Ct. 2013).
246
Howard, 426 F. Supp. 3d at 1256–57.
247
Andrews, 381 F. Supp. 3d at 1063.
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violate an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy by revealing
information from inside a protected space, and when tracking is performed
in real time, police will be unable to predict in advance whether such a
violation will occur. Moreover, without constitutional protection,
defendants may lack any adequate remedy if a court later finds that no
exigency existed to otherwise justify the tracking. Therefore, real-time,
short-term tracking of a cellphone under § 2702(c)(4) should be
considered a search and presumptively require a warrant.

A. GPS Tracking May Violate an Objectively Reasonable Privacy
Expectation by Revealing Information from Inside Protected Spaces
Certain spaces, such as the home, have always received the highest
Fourth Amendment protections.248 Keeping these spaces secure from
improper police intrusion accords both subjective and objectively
reasonable expectations of privacy and is therefore one of the few
continuous threads running through the cases above.249 Accordingly, none
of the previously cited decisions have held that tracking is permissible in
any form or for any length of time, if it transmits a defendant’s location
from inside such a space, and for which neither a search nor an arrest
warrant has been issued. Excepting short-term, live GPS tracking of
cellphones from Fourth Amendment protections would expose defendants
to the risk that information, which would be protected in other scenarios,
will be available to law enforcement without judicial oversight, 250 thereby
violating an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy.
This view is not without precedent. Karo found short-term, live
tracking to constitute a search where the tracked object left a public road
and transmitted its location from inside a residence.251 The Kyllo court
similarly concluded that, “[t]he Fourth Amendment’s protection of the
home has never been tied to … the quality or quantity of information
obtained,”252 and therefore held that using technology to gather any
information that otherwise would have required “physical ‘intrusion into
a constitutionally protected area’” constitutes a search.253

248

See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37, 40 (2001).
Id. at 40; United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 709–10, 714 (1984); Howard,
426 F. Supp. 3d at 1257.
250
See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217, 2223 (2018) (plurality
opinion) (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring)) (holding that obtaining historical CSLI requires a warrant in part because
of information it might reveal from constitutionally protected paces).
251
Karo, 468 U.S. at 709–10, 714.
252
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37.
253
Id. at 34 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).
249
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With respect to cellphones in particular, Justice Sotomayor’s
concurrence in Jones, a case which itself involved real-time tracking,254
cautioned that “even short-term” GPS monitoring might create a
“comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects …
familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”255
That this information could be collected covertly and maintained
indefinitely by the government, she opined, rendered such monitoring
practices particularly “susceptible to abuse” when unconstrained by
judicial scrutiny.256 This concern formed part of the basis for the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Carpenter, which held that the collection of historical
CSLI required a warrant and noted that cellphones, “faithfully follow[]
[their] owner[s] beyond public thoroughfares and into private residences,
doctor’s offices, political headquarters, and other potentially revealing
locales.”257 These views have similarly been echoed by lower courts
analyzing short-term, real-time electronic surveillance post-Carpenter.258
In justifying the warrantless tracking of a truck, the Howard court, citing
both Carpenter and Karo, noted that, unlike vehicles, “[c]ell phones
follow their owners into homes and other constitutionally protected
spaces.”259
If the purpose of these prior holdings is to protect the “sanctity of the
home” and similar locations from technological penetration otherwise
impossible without a warrant,260 then in a post-Carpenter era, courts
should consider short-term, live GPS tracking of a cellphone a search, at
least in those instances where the phone enters a protected space.261 The
sophistication of modern GPS technology exacerbates the potential
problems in failing to do so. When Caraballo was decided in 2016, the
court described cellphone GPS tracking as “quite precise,” noting it to be
accurate within “8 to 46 meters.”262 Even two years prior, however, the
average smartphone’s GPS could pinpoint the phone’s location to within

254

Jones, 565 U.S. at 403.
Id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
256
Id. at 416.
257
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217–18 (2018) (plurality
opinion).
258
United States v. Howard, 426 F. Supp. 3d 1247, 1257 (M.D. Ala. 2019).
259
Id.
260
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001).
261
See Implementing Carpenter, supra note 82 (manuscript at 3) (suggesting a
framework under which, to be protected by the Fourth Amendment after Carpenter,
information must be made available through “digital-age” technology, must not be
revealed by a “user’s meaningful, voluntary choice,” and must reveal an “intimate
portrait of a person’s life”). It is unclear whether short-term tracking under §
2702(c)(4) would meet this proposed standard. Id.
262
United States v. Caraballo, 831 F.3d 95, 99 (2d Cir. 2016).
255
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4.9 meters – sixteen feet – under ideal conditions.263 This is at least an
order of magnitude more precise than the information ascertainable from
CSLI in 2018, when the Supreme Court determined that acquisition of
Timothy Carpenter’s location data constituted a search.264 The Court
considered that, over a long enough time, even location information
accurate within a range of fifty meters to four miles could provide a
sufficiently clear picture of a defendant’s private activities to warrant
constitutional protection.265
Even under less than ideal conditions, the level of accuracy now
achievable with GPS is likely more than sufficient to reveal not only a
person’s near-precise location within a home or other protected space but
also, by extension, myriad “intimate” activities as contemplated in
Kyllo.266 With limited additional information, police could readily
determine,267 “at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily
sauna and bath” even more precisely than with the heat-vision camera the
Kyllo court confronted.268 Overall, the precision of modern GPS creates
privacy concerns that surely surpass those in both Kyllo and Karo, where
the Court found the officers’ actions to constitute a search.269 It is unlikely
that many members of society subjectively expect police to have the
unbridled authority to precisely track them between and within the
constitutionally protected areas contemplated in Carpenter.270 In light of
the ubiquity and sophistication of cellphones and their virtual necessity to
nearly every aspect of modern life, this privacy expectation is objectively
reasonable.271 The determination to allow even the possibility of such
263
GPS
Accuracy,
GPS.GOV,
https://www.gps.gov/systems/gps/performance/accuracy/#:~:text=For%20example%
2C%20GPS%2Denabled%20smartphones,receivers%20and%2For%20augmentation
%20systems [https://perma.cc/QRF7-6JBB] (Apr. 22, 2020) (official U.S.
government website describing the functioning of GPS infrastructure. Noting that
precision can be reduced by features such as buildings or trees in the landscape or
when the device is indoors); Frank van Diggelen & Per Enge, The World’s First GPS
MOOC and Worldwide Laboratory Using Smartphones, Proceedings of the 28th
International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of the Institute of Navigation
361–69 (Tampa, Fla. Sept. 2015) (compiling worldwide GPS data from 2014, which
revealed a mean accuracy of 4.9 meters).
264
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018) (plurality opinion).
265
Id. at 2218–19.
266
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38–39 (2001).
267
See Implementing Carpenter, supra note 82 (manuscript at 34) (noting that
without clearer Fourth Amendment protections, the “invasiveness” of information
police gather and, therefore, whether their actions constitute a search, may change
based on what other information police know).
268
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34–35.
269
Id.; United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984).
270
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217–18.
271
See id. at 2220.
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invasion should therefore be made by a, “neutral and detached magistrate
instead of … by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime.”272
Cases which have found that short-term, live tracking is not a search
may have done so in part because the tracked object never transmitted
information from inside a protected space prior to the defendant’s arrest.273
Further, unlike the historical CSLI in Carpenter, it may not be necessary
to protect a defendant’s real-time GPS position in exclusively public
spaces because the tracking is brief, and the information gathered about
the defendant’s life is comparatively minimal. 274 It may therefore be
tempting, as hypothesized in Kyllo, to fashion a standard by which only
tracking that in fact reveals protected activities constitutes a search.275
When police initiate tracking of a phone, however, they have no way of
knowing whether the person to be monitored will carry the phone into a
protected space.276 This would leave police, as the Kyllo court noted,
“unable to know in advance whether [their activities are]
constitutional.”277 As cellphones so rarely leave their owners’ sides,
however,278 the chances that even short-term live tracking will capture
activity within a protected space is substantial.
Finally, insofar as the duration of tracking may influence whether a
search has occurred,279 little specific guidance has been provided to courts
as to how much is enough to trigger Fourth Amendment protections.280
“[T]he Fourth Amendment requires certainty,”281 and the foregoing
272

Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
See United States v. Riley, 858 F.3d 1012, 1018 (6th Cir. 2017) (per curiam);
United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 778, 780 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Howard, 426 F. Supp. 3d 1247, 1257 (M.D. Ala. 2019).
274
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (“A person does not surrender all Fourth
Amendment protection by venturing into the public sphere.”).
275
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38–39 (2001); see also Implementing
Carpenter, supra note 82 (manuscript at 28) (rejecting a “subjective approach” which
would determine whether a search occurred based on whether an “[intimate] portrait
has [actually] been painted” based on the information police learn).
276
Police initiate tracking specifically because they do not know where a
defendant is.
277
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 39; see also Implementing Carpenter, supra note 82
(manuscript at 29) (noting that determining whether a search under Carpenter has
occurred in general, based on a retrospective look at information actually learned,
would prevent police from knowing in advance whether their actions would constitute
a search and prevent defendants from knowing whether a search had occurred).
278
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
279
Implementing Carpenter, supra note 82 (manuscript at 36).
280
Id. (manuscript at 37).
281
Id. (manuscript at 2) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment requires certainty. The
police need to know what they legally can do, and the citizen needs to know what the
police legally can’t do.” (emphasis in original)).
273

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss4/8

30

Guinan: Giving up the Ghost in the Machine: Emergency Cellphone Tracking

2021]

LIVE EMERGENCY CELLPHONE TRACKING

1327

ambiguities therefore lend further credence to the position that all shortterm, real-time tracking of cellphones, however defined, should constitute
a search and presumptively require a warrant.282 Such a standard respects
an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in live cellphone location
data.

B. Section 2702(c)(4) Provides an Inadequate Remedy When a Court
Finds No Exigency Existed
Police tracking a cellphone pursuant to a § 2702(c)(4) request often
do so in order to effect the immediate arrest of a potentially dangerous
subject.283 When the emergency provision in § 2702(c)(4) and the
exigency exception to the warrant requirement are held to be coextensive,
any proper disclosure under the emergency provision will render a warrant
unnecessary, even if a search was technically performed.284 As such, the
question of whether this form of tracking constitutes a search may often
appear moot, and it may be so in many cases. Because the SCA does not
provide a means of suppressing information improperly disclosed under
its provisions, however,285 when courts hold that the Fourth Amendment
is not applicable, a defendant is left only with the possibility of a civil
action were the court to find that police failed to meet the emergency
standard in § 2702(c)(4).286 Such a remedy is inadequate in the face of a
criminal conviction.
Some of the cases that justified tracking based on exigent
circumstances tacitly referenced the possibility of an underlying warrant
requirement.287 In Sauceda, police sought a warrant for a second phone
owned by the defendant before requesting emergency location data for the
tracked phone without a warrant.288 The Caraballo court at one point
suggested a warrant would have been “preferable,”289 while in Gilliam,

282

See id. (manuscript at 40–41) (Advocating for a near bright-line rule that a
search has occurred when police use “digital technology to obtain information”
previously unavailable, “and that can reveal the privacies of life.” No specific
discussion of short-term, live GPS tracking or the emergency provision of the SCA.).
283
See, e.g., United States v. Takai, 943 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1317–18 (D. Utah
2013).
284
United States v. Gilliam, 842 F.3d 801, 804 (2d Cir. 2016).
285
18 U.S.C §§ 2707, 2708, 2712 (respectfully, exclusive civil remedy against
an entity for improper disclosure, general exclusivity of remedies, and civil remedy
against the government for willful violations of the SCA).
286
See, e.g., People v. Moorer, 959 N.Y.S.2d 868, 875–76, 879 (Co. Ct. 2013).
287
See, e.g., Gilliam, 842 F.3d at 803–04 n.2 (2d Cir. 2016); United States v.
Caraballo, 831 F.3d 95, 105 n.9 (2d Cir. 2016); United States v. Sauceda, No. 4:16CR-40083-01-KES, 2017 WL 4676606, at *4 (D.S.D. Sept. 27, 2017).
288
Sauceda, 2017 WL 4676606, at *4.
289
Caraballo, 831 F.3d at 105 n.9.
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GPS tracking was presumed to constitute a search.290 At least in the latter
case, this suggests the possibility that had no exigency existed to satisfy
both the statutory and constitutional standards involved, a warrant would
have been required.
Courts may fail to find an exigency for a variety of reasons. Whether
or not an exigency exists is a fact-specific determination,291 and courts may
simply differ on this point.292 Further, a lack of judicial oversight may
permit misconduct by police and abuse of the § 2702(c)(4) emergency
request process, or at least create a perverse incentive to stretch the bounds
of what constitutes an exigency. The defendant in Andrews alleged that
police lied on their emergency request to his service provider for GPS
data.293 While the court found no evidence of this,294 if police are merely
required to send a request to a cellphone company claiming exigent
circumstances, the possibility exists. Justice Sotomayor voiced similar
concerns over the potential for such abuses should police have unrestricted
access to GPS tracking data.295
Where a court finds, for any reason, that no exigency existed to justify
a § 2702(c)(4) request, a defendant facing 240 months in prison is unlikely
to be satisfied by the chance to sue the government or a cellphone
company;296 the courts should not be either, as this remedy provides little
deterrence to law-enforcement agencies against filing facially
inappropriate emergency requests. Moreover, this assumes a defendant
would even be able to sue the government under § 2712 for a violation of
§ 2702(c)(4), as the later section, by its terms, restricts only the behavior
of service providers and not of the government.297 In light of this, and
perhaps unsurprisingly, Timothy Carpenter himself, facing over 100 years
in prison, challenged part of the SCA on constitutional grounds and
specifically sought suppression of his CSLI data.298 Treating GPS tracking
as a search would still permit waiver of the warrant requirement where a
true exigency exists,299 but it would also allow defendants to attempt to
exclude evidence obtained through tracking where a court later determines

290
291

Gilliam, 842 F.3d at 804 n.2.
Id. at 804 (quoting United States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766, 769 (2d Cir.

1990)).
292
Brigham City v. Utah, 547 U.S. 398, 407 (2006) (reversing the Supreme
Court of Utah based on a finding of exigent circumstances).
293
United States v. Andrews, 381 F. Supp. 3d 1044, 1062 (D. Minn. 2019).
294
Id.
295
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
296
Gilliam, 842 F.3d at 802; 18 U.S.C. §§ 2707, 2712.
297
18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(a), 2712.
298
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212–13 (2018) (plurality
opinion).
299
See id. at 2211.
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one did not.300 Suppression of evidence resulting from an improper search
is a typical remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation and is often justified
by its deterrent effect on police misconduct.301 Eventually, police might
also be less able to avoid suppression based on “good faith reliance” on §
2702(c)(4).302
The SCA too seems to contemplate the possibility of a remedy based
upon a constitutional violation, in that the general exclusivity-of-remedies
provision covers only “nonconstitutional” violations of the Act.303 Failing
to consider GPS tracking under § 2702(c)(4) a search appears to flout this
purpose. Defendants are incongruously denied the ability to suppress
evidence obtained based on a standard that is nearly identical to the exigent
circumstances exception but that is not necessarily subject to a Fourth
Amendment inquiry.304 The need to provide defendants with an adequate
remedy when the emergency standard under § 2702(c)(4) is not met further
substantiates the argument that live, short-term GPS tracking of cellphones
should be treated as a search.

C. Courts May Decide Not to Require a Search Warrant for GPS
Tracking under § 2702(c)(4) when an Arrest Warrant Has Already
Issued
Absent an exception,305 police seeking to explore items and locations
protected by the Fourth Amendment must first obtain a search warrant.306
Both search and arrest warrants, however, issue based on a finding of
probable cause.307 Because live GPS tracking seeks only the defendant’s
physical location, an arrest warrant may provide sufficient grounds to
initiate tracking.308
The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, supra note 44, at 581–82 (“If the
police violate a reasonable expectation of privacy and no exception applies, the
evidence obtained ordinarily will be suppressed and the wrongdoer may go free.”).
301
Id. at 581; Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (quoting Pa. Bd.
of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998)).
302
See, e.g., United States v. Takai, 943 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1323–24 (D. Utah
2013) (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); United States v. Graham,
846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 389 (D. Md. 2012)).
303
18 U.S.C. § 2708. Note, however, that § 2712, which provides for an
exclusive civil remedy against the government, contains no similar carveout for
potential “constitutional” violations. 18 U.S.C. § 2712(a), (d).
304
See, e.g., Takai, 943 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1324.
305
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
306
The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, supra note 44, at 574.
307
See United States v. Riley, 858 F.3d 1012, 1020 (6th Cir. 2017) (Boggs, J.,
concurring) (per curiam) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602–03 (1980))
(arrest warrants); United States v. Beckett, 369 Fed. App’x. 52, 56–57 (11th Cir. 2010)
(search warrants).
308
See Riley, 858 F.3d at 1020 (Boggs, J., concurring).
300
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As explained by the concurrence in United States v. Riley, when
police have an arrest warrant based on probable cause and reasonable
suspicion to believe that a defendant is physically located within his home,
they may enter and effect an arrest without a search warrant. 309 That
opinion reasoned that police should therefore be permitted the lesser
intrusion of obtaining only the physical location of a defendant’s
cellphone, even inside a protected space, based on an arrest warrant, when
they reasonably suspect the defendant to be in possession of the phone.310
This argument is persuasive and was later adopted by the district court in
Sauceda.311
It is unclear whether, in the presence of an arrest warrant, courts
would find that no Fourth Amendment protections attach to the
defendant’s location at all,312 or merely that the existence of an arrest
warrant satisfies the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.313
Regardless, if presumptively required to seek a warrant of any kind in
conjunction with a § 2702(c)(4) request, police would lack the unrestricted
access to GPS location data that might permit abuse of the emergency
tracking process.314
To prevent unforeseeable intrusion into protected spaces and to
provide defendants with the ability to suppress location data when the §
2702(c)(4) emergency provision is not satisfied, courts should treat the
real-time, short-term GPS tracking of the cellphone of a criminal suspect
as a search subject to the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Such
tracking would presumptively require a search warrant unless an arrest
warrant had previously been issued.315 The Katz framework requires an
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy based on societal
standards.316 These standards, however, may change to demand greater
protections as tracking technology evolves.317 Perhaps the best evidence

309

Id.
Id.
311
United States v. Sauceda, No. 4:16-CR-40083-01-KES, 2017 WL 4676606,
at *10 (D.S.D. Sept. 27, 2017).
312
See Riley, 858 F.3d at 1020 (Boggs, J., concurring) (“[O]fficers … may track
that cellphone’s location in order to facilitate the execution of the [arrest] warrant,
without implicating the Fourth Amendment.”).
313
See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980) (“for Fourth Amendment
purposes, an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the
limited authority to enter a dwelling…”).
314
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
315
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
316
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
317
See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (plurality
opinion); Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also Implementing
Carpenter, supra note 82 (manuscript at 8) (“[T]he question is whether technological
310
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of this is the disclosure restrictions placed on providers by the SCA itself,
the plain purpose of which was to prevent overreaching intrusion by the
government with regard to electronically stored information.318 Insofar as
congressional representatives execute the will of the electorate, the SCA
safeguards enacted these changing societal expectations based on a
flexible standard that “advance[s] with … technology.”319

V. CONCLUSION
In its Fourth Amendment decisions through Carpenter, the Supreme
Court narrowed the scope of the third-party doctrine while expanding
constitutional protections for electronically stored information
commensurate with the evolution of cellphone technology and societal
expectations of privacy.320 The concurrences in Jones heralded a binding
opinion in Carpenter six years later,321 and while the question of whether
constitutional privacy protections will swell to categorically encompass
the short-term, live tracking of cellphones under § 2702(c)(4) remains
unanswered, history seems bound to repeat itself. Whether such
protections might similarly be founded on a dissenting opinion, such as
the principles of bailment described by Justice Gorsuch in Carpenter,322
or on other grounds is unclear.
Regardless, when police engage in the real-time tracking of a
suspect’s cellphone, based on an emergency request under § 2702(c)(4),
courts should presumptively require a warrant, even if the tracking is
limited in time. This approach still allows for situations in which a search
warrant may not be required, such as when a true exigency exists or when
police possess a valid warrant for the defendant’s arrest.323 Absent such
mitigating circumstances, however, attaching constitutional protections to
this type of monitoring enhances safeguards for a defendant’s
constitutionally protected activities,324 serves the fundamental goals of the
SCA,325 and provides a meaningful remedy when police get it wrong.326

change has rendered obsolete a past expectation of a practical limit on government
power.”).
318
S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 5 (1986).
319
Id.
320
See Implementing Carpenter, supra note 82 (manuscript at 1, 8).
321
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2215, 2217.
322
Id. at 2270 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
323
See United States v. Riley, 858 F.3d 1012, 1020 (6th Cir. 2017) (Boggs, J.,
concurring) (per curiam) (arrest warrant); United States v. Takai, 943 F. Supp. 2d
1315, 1322–23 (D. Utah 2013) (exigency).
324
See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38 (2001).
325
S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 5 (1986).
326
Contra People v. Moorer, 959 N.Y.S.2d 868, 875–76, 879 (Co. Ct. 2013).
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Managing the balance of privacy and security in a free society is a
precarious and constantly evolving challenge and one that is ultimately left
to the voting public. The present issue is ripe for litigation, and the
Supreme Court should avail itself of any opportunity to further expand and
standardize Fourth Amendment protections for electronically stored
location data.
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